

Muslim Political Dynamics Post-Tahkim: A Case Study of the Shiffin War

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ABSTRACT

Keywords: chiffon; tahkim; division; khutbah. The Shiffin War, a battle that took place between the Ali bin Abi Talib group and the Mu'awiyah, was a war whose negative impact was felt by Muslims. In fact, in the view of historians, it has resulted in divisions among large groups of Muslims. Although it ended with him which was intended as an attempt to arbitrate between Muslims who were in conflict, it turned out that the effort just stared at the dissatisfaction between them, so three religious-political groups emerged that are still suspected to exist today as a continuation of the phenomenon of division at that time. The rise of Shi'a, Khawarij, and Sunni groups is understood by historians as the impact of the war. Because the awareness of ukhuwah among Muslims has not yet flourished, the division is still felt and there are no significant enough signs to subside, let alone leading to the awakening of ukhuwah consciousness which is marked by the desire to build a dialogue that is built with awareness to bridge the rift that occurs among Muslims, especially from their leaders. Especially for interest groups who see that the tension between Muslims will give them political benefits. In fact, with the right spirit of ukhuwwah, the problem of division between Muslims can be solved.



Introduction

The two companions of the Prophet (Muhammad) (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) who are described by historians as objectively opposed to the events of the Shiffin war were Ali bin Abi Talib and Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufyan. And it is undeniable that these two people (friends) are the main characters in the war. So historians also explain it with various explanations, in harmony with their respective perspectives. In Shi'a sources, of course, Ali bin Talib is considered a hero, and on the other hand, sources who are on the side of Mu'awiyah's character, give appreciation to Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufyan as his hero. Meanwhile, historians, including Muslim and non-Muslim historians, who try to be objective in assessing that the two figures (Ali bin Abi Talib and Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufyan) were in a dilemma because the socio-

political situation and conditions at that time were in a chaotic position. So the conflict between the two was resolved by war (Syifa, 2022).

Actually, from the beginning of the election, initiation, until the election of Ali bin Abi Talib to serve as caliph, he was always faced with a complicated political atmosphere, because of the interference from various parties who wanted to bring him down. Until the Jamal war, it was suspected that many provocateurs tried to pit the companions of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) against each other. Fortunately, some companions were not provoked, such as Sa'ad bin Abi Waqqas, Sa'id bin Zaid, Zaid bin Tsabit, Muhammad bin Maslamah, Abdullah bin Umar, and Abu Musa al-Ash'ari. However, some of the companions were provoked, such as Talhah and Zubair, who then together with 'Aisha resisted Ali bin Abi Talib in the battle of Jamal. (Mubarrak, 2020).

As in the Jamal war, even in the Shiffin war, Ali bin Abi Talib could not avoid confronting Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, because the two could not agree on peace, so on Wednesday, 8 Shafar 37 H./26 July 657, there was the Shiffin war, which was viewed, especially by Muslim historians, as a heartbreaking slander, because it was from that war that the spirit of brotherhood between Muslims and Muslims was really at a nadir. (El-Shimy, 2015). Not to mention, the Shiffin war also continued with a feud between Ali bin Abi Talib and his followers and the Khawarij, known as the Nahrawan orang, which although it ended in victory on the side of Ali bin Abi Talib, on the 20th of Ramadan 40 H. (660 AD.) Ali bin Abi Talib was killed by one of Khawarij's followers Abdur Rahman bin Muljam (Ariga & Ilham, 2023).

When faced with Ali bin Abi Talib, Mu'awiyah was often underestimated, even though he was one of the companions who had advantages compared to other companions. Among other things, it was he who Umar bin al-Khaththab trusted to unite the whole of Sham under his leadership and some of his important tasks. (Nahar, 2020). The Prophet (saw), as narrated by Abdullah bin Abbas, acknowledged him as a Faqih. (Kubro & Faizah, 2019). Ibn al-Arabi stated, that if anyone thinks that it was Mu'awiyah who poisoned Hasan bin Ali so that he died, it is a lie, for two reasons. First, Hasan bin Ali had handed over his leadership to Mu'awiyah, so that there was no concern of Mu'awiyah about Hasan. Second, there is no evidence that Mu'awiyah has done it, let alone supported by justice and his safe attitude. (Alomar, 2016). Ibn Taymiyyah, in his book *Minhâj as-Sunnah*, 2/225, as quoted by Ibn al-Arabi, stated, that the accusations of the Shi'a against Mu'awiyah, that he was the one who poisoned Hasan is an accusation without evidence.

Method

This article is the result of a search of manuscripts about the Shiffin War, its background, and impact, both in the form of books, journals, and non-book articles that are expected to map the problem of conflict between the two Muslim forces represented by Ali bin Abi Talib and Mu'awiyah bin Abu Sufyan and their supporters to find out the

root of the problem and its impact. His study was carried out with a critical historical approach and socio-political analysis.

The main source of this study is the writings compiled by Muhammad Abu Zahrah, W. Montgomery Watt (Islamic Political Thought M.A. Shaban (Islamic History, A.D. 600-7500 (A.H.132): A New Interpretation), Thaha Husein, Defamation al-Kubrâ. Meanwhile, for the sake of analysis, the author includes several supporting books, mainly the writings of Nourouzzaman Shiddiqi (Shia and Khawarij in Historical Perspective; Introduction to Muslim History; Shi'ah and Khawarij in the Historical Perspective of Yogyakarta: PLP2M and Tamaddun Muslim), Suyuthi Pulungan (Fiqh Siyasah Teachings, History and Thought and Principles of Government in the Medina Charter Reviewed from the View of the Quran), and Munawir Sjadzali (Islam and Governance: Teachings, History and Thought).

Using critical-qualitative reasoning, the author describes and analyzes historical data about the Shiffin war along with its background and impact, the role of its figures, and the implications of the results of the research applied can be 'ibrah, especially for the benefit of Muslims to knit back ukhuwah that has been lost due to long conflicts related to feudal events between Muslims which are quite tiring.

Results and Discussion

The Shiffin War has indeed resulted in an agreement between the warring parties. Conflicts that occur among Muslims are expected to be resolved by arbitration, known as Tahkim. However, this Tahkîm did not produce the peace that the two warring groups hoped for. It produced a new division among Muslims, with the birth of the Khawarij group in addition to Sunnis and Shi'a who were perceived as the embryo of the division of Muslims in the next period.

Tahkim in Islamic Political Turmoil

Starting from the above, this study will use At-Thkim; A Historical Review with a descriptive-analytical reflective-historical method. By not ignoring the sociological-political approach (de Nardis & de Nardis, 2020). This paper attempts to answer the questions surrounding at-Tahkîm, why does at-Tahkîm occur? From which side did the idea come from? How is the process of at-Tahkîm, where are their disputes located and what is the post-Tahkîm impact?

Dialogue between Ali bin Abi Talib represented by Abu Musa al-Ash'arial-Ash'ari and Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufyan represented by Amru bin 'Ash in Tahkîm.

From the negotiations, a decree was taken that Uthman bin Affan had died of persecution, and the guardian of the persecuted dead had the right to demand retribution. And Mu'awiyah is the one who has the most right to demand revenge for Uthman's death.

Then the negotiations turned to the issue of proposing the removal of Ali and Mu'awiyah from their respective positions. After that, the caliph's position was handed over to the Muslims to choose who they wanted. This idea was put forward by Abu Musa al-Ash'arial-Ash'ari and approved by Amru bin 'Ash. And the meeting continued the next day.

After Abu Musa al-Ash'arial-Ash'ari returned to his faction and presented the results of the negotiations, Abdullah bin Abbas warned him of Amru bin 'Ash's cunning and advised him to speak first. However, Amr bin al-'Ash was not lacking in wisdom. He did not want to go forward first, because Abu Musa al-Ash'arial-'Ash'ari was older than him, emigrated first, and converted to Islam first.

So Abu Musa al-Ash'arial-Ash'ari appeared first to the Muslims, announced the results of the negotiations, and stated that He had agreed to remove Ali bin Abi Tahlib from his position. After that, Amr bin al-'Ash stood up and declared, bringing He agreed with Abu Musa al-Ash'arial-Ash'ari's statement that Ali bin Abi Talib was dismissed, then He also announced, because Ali bin Abi Talib had been dismissed, He also stated to appoint Mu'awiyah as Caliph. (Bamanie, 2016).

Historians view that the outcome of Tahkîm Shiffin is not the best or ideal solution for Muslims. Because it turns out that the results are not significant enough for the interests of ishlâh, it is mainly related to the importance of repairing the Muslim Brotherhood which is being damaged as a result of their internal conflicts., It is even suspected that the results of the taken only satisfy the Mu'awiyah and their supporters, while the Ali and its supporters have suffered a lot, and have caused division among Ali's supporters. The group loyal to the leadership of Ali bin Abi Talib was solid and then led to the formation of a new group called the Shi'a Ali, and the opposition group agreed to abandon Ali bin Abi Talib because Ali bin Abi Talib was considered to have deviated from the law of Allah because he approved of the results of Tahkîm, which they considered to be defective in faith and moral. They, later known to historians as Khawarij, Jahlul Qurra', a term known to historians as a group of Qur'anic scholars, protested against the outcome of Tahkîm which was considered to be very detrimental to Ali, by proposing adagio: "Lâ human illâ lillâh" (there is no law except Allah's), which in the history of Islamic civilization was later known as the Khawarij Doctrine. They, who felt that they represented a group of Muslims who were consistent in upholding the law of Allah, demanded that Ali bin Abi Talib reject the results of the negotiations (Tahkîm). However, Ali bin Abi Talib refused their request, which they did not know the reason for, because Ali bin Talib never gave them an explanation. (Abbas, 2021).

From this discussion, it can be concluded that Tahkîm which is intended as an effort for peace does not meet the qualifications as a decision made by Muslims who are at war. It has caused new divisions. Because, the results of Tahkîm are seen as something that benefits one party (Mu'awiyah and its supporters), and vice versa harms the other party (Ali and his supporters).

Apart from the results that have been formulated, Muslims are divided into 3 major groups: (1) The supporters of Mu'awiyah, which later became known as Sunni; (2) The loyal supporters of Ali bin Abi Talib, who became known as Shia; and (3) the group of opponents of Mu'awiyah and Ali, which became known as Khawarij.

This division not only creates internal conflicts that rely on political interests. However, it also rests on the interests of aqidah. So the division between Muslims,

partly as a result of the Shiffin war which ended with Tahkîm, is increasingly difficult to avoid.

The Tahkîm event, as explained above, can be said to be the decisive cause (trigger) for the further development of Islamic political thought after Al-Khulafâ' al-Râsyidûn. First, it can be seen from the diplomatic defeat of Ali bin Abi Talib over Mu'awiyah which then led to the group of supporters of Ali bin Abi Talib who had a political framework that led to the preservation and development of imamatic doctrine. Second, Mu'awiyah's diplomatic victory then gave rise to a thought that seemed to have the characteristics of a caliphate like the thinking of non-Shi'a people during the reign of Al-Khulafâ' al-Râsyidûn. Third, (the Tahkîm incident) gave rise to the dissatisfaction of some of Ali bin Abi Talib from the Ahlul Qurra' group, which then continued with the emergence of the Khawarij thought group with its basic doctrine: "La hukma illâ lillâh."

The Conspiracy to Kill Ali bin Abi Talib

Based on historical sources, especially from Shi'a sources, Ash'ats bin Qais knew about the martyrdom of Ali bin Abi Talib. According to Yaqubi's report, when Ibn Muljam left Egypt for Kufa, he stayed in the house of Ash'ats bin Qais for one month and prepared his sword. According to one report, Ash'ats bin Qais asked Ibn Muljam to carry out his intention, which was to kill Ali bin Abi Talib, before dawn so that it would not be exposed in the community. After Ibn Muljam slashed Ali bin Abi Talib, Ash'ats sent his son, Qais, to report his condition to him. A narration from Imam ash-Sadiq also narrates the role of the Ash'ats in the martyrdom of Ali bin Abi Talib. However, there is a historical report that when the Ash'ats learned of Ibn Muljam's intentions, he informed Ali bin Abi Talib. It is also stated in historical sources that Ash'ats threatened Ali bin Abi Talib with death. (Saprida, 2021).

Meanwhile, if we look back, actually Abu Musa al-Ash'arial-Ash'ari was not a person who should be trusted by Ali bin Abi Talib in his political role during the time of Umar bin Khaththab and Uthman bin 'Affan where he (Abu Musa al-Ash'arial-Ash'ari) played a role as a supporter of the caliph Umar bin Khaththab who had gained trust to become a governor in Egypt during his caliphate and continued in the first half of Uthman bin 'Affan's leadership. 'Affan and at the same time the opposition of the Ali bin Abi Talib group.

While A. Syalabi looked at the other side of the Mu'awiyah side, besides Mu'awiyah himself who had the desire to gain political power under the pretext of demanding revenge for the death of Uthman bin 'Affan and questioning the legitimate caliphate of Muslims, on his side there was a person who played a very important role in winning the negotiations on the Tahkîm event, namely: Amr bin al-'Ash, a reliable politician who once played the role of a supporter of Umar bin al-Khaththab who although he did not get an important position during the caliphate of Uthman bin 'Affan, he also played the role of the opposition of Ali bin Abi Talib group who is not impossible to have the desire to restore his important position after the end of the reign of Uthman bin 'Affan. By taking advantage of the volatile political situation during the

leadership transition. He as a politician is quite observant in reading the situation and to whom he must be affiliated to regain the political position that he had obtained during the reign of Umar bin al-Khattab. At a critical time amid a war that seemed to have tended to be in a position of victory on the side of Ali bin Abi Talib, Mu'awiyah asked for his active role to hold back the victory of Ali bin Abi Talib. With his ability he managed to lure the group of Ali bin Abi Talib, which was dominated by the Bedouin community, with the legitimacy of 'mushaf' (as a symbol of the unity and unity of the Muslims) placed at the spearhead, to negotiate and win it. The diplomatic victory on the part of Mu'awiyah recognized or not, in the opinion of A. Syllabi was a great merit of Amr bin al-'Ash (Naqvi, 2015).

Historians view that the outcome of Tahkîm Shiffin is not the best or ideal solution for Muslims. Because, it turns out that the results are not significant enough for the interests of ishlâh, mainly related to the importance of repairing the Muslim brotherhood which is being damaged as a result of their internal conflicts. It is even suspected that the results of the Tahkîm only satisfy the Mu'awiyah and their supporters. Meanwhile, Ali and his supporters have suffered a lot, and have caused division among Ali's supporters. The group loyal to the leadership of Ali bin Abi Talib was solid and then led to the formation of a new group called the Shi'a Ali, and the opposition group agreed to abandon Ali bin Abi Talib because Ali bin Abi Talib was considered to have deviated from the law of Allah because he approved of the results of Tahkîm, which they considered to be defective in faith and moral. They, hereinafter known to historians as Khawarij, Bahkah Ahlul Qurra', a term known to historians as a group of Qur'anic scholars, protested against the outcome of the negotiations (Tahkîm) which was seen as very detrimental to Ali's side, by proposing the adagio: "Lâ human illâ lillâh" (there is no law except Allah's), which later in the history of Islamic civilization became known as the Khawarij doctrine. They, who felt that they represented a group of Muslims who were consistent in upholding the law of Allah, demanded that Ali bin Abi Talib reject the results of the negotiations (Tahkîm). However, Ali bin Abi Talib refused their request, which they did not know the reason for, because Ali bin Talib never gave them an explanation. (Aali & Al-Salihi, 2023).

To explain these streams chronologically, according to the period of growth and development is quite complicated since each of them grew up in a period that is difficult to distinguish from the other. The growth of political and theological thought among Muslims cannot be categorically singled out. Each form of thought of Muslims is sometimes simultaneously theological and political. Moreover, in the post-Shiffin period, the three schools of thought seem to appear simultaneously as a result of almost the same problems surrounding the leadership of Muslims. For this reason, the author dares to explain randomly without pretension that what is presented first, grows earlier than the next one and vice versa.

The Shi'a school of thought is in line with the doctrine of its mama, arguing that religion and the state are two sides that cannot be separated. According to Shi'ah, the state is a political institution as well as a religious institution. The government of the

country must be based on the concept of divine sovereignty because sovereignty comes from and belongs to God. In the concept of Shi'a, the imam 'is an extension of God's hand' in the world, with the predicate of 'ishmah, when he acts in the imamah, he acts in the name of God, so in the Shi'a concept the imamah should not even be naïve to submit to the will of 'shura'. He must be present in a perfect state of faith through wishâyah. And one important principle in Shi'a political theory is the obligatory shari'a. (Mavani, 2013) This school of thought is still owned by the Shi'a Imamiyah group in general (it a 'asyariyah and isma'iliyah, with somewhat different specifications for the selection of imam figures), except for the Zaidiyah Shi'ah who think that this issue of faith is an ijthadiyah problem that needs to be formulated in a worldly context. For the zaidiyah, the imam is an ordinary human being who is not kept from sin and is chosen through deliberation. However, the nominated imams must be the descendants of Ali-Fatimah with sufficient requirements of knowledge, piety, generosity, and courage to hold the position of imam. On the other hand, they recognize the validity of the caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar bin Khaththab as an exception to his opinion that the figure of the imamah should be from the descendants of Ali-Fatimah because both of them are two companions of the Prophet who are just and capable of upholding the truth. In addition, (indeed, both) were wanted by the majority of Muslims at that time. (Ariyani, 2017).

The non-Shi'a school of thought that later developed into a typical Sunni school views this political leadership as an ijthadiyah affair. Therefore the authority of man to formulate his system is seen as an absolute possibility. Sunnis in general also during the reign of Mu'awiyah saw a symbiotic relationship between religion and the state. Religion on the one hand is a source of inspiration and the state on the other hand is a tool of its embodiment. This principle then gave birth to the concept of 'shura' with its various implementations. It's just that later the Sunni state-political concepts seemed more compromised, especially during the reign of the Banu Umayyah. There are indications that this concept is also used by the Murji'ah School as a middle ground for two opposite poles: Shi'a and Khawarij. (Arifin, 2024).

The Khawarij school as the third group has a more theocentric thinking pattern. But it recognizes the existence of human rights to ijthad on state political issues. The basic doctrine is lâ hukma illâ lillâh with a ritualistic form of understanding. When they see that Mu'awiyah and Ali are mortal sinners, in fact, they implicitly judge that both of them and those who have the same character or belong to their group do not have the right to be caliphs. Although Khawarij is seen as 'democratic', it does not mean that it is the same as democracy as understood by Westerners. None of their slogans are the same as Vox Populi, Vox Dei (the voice of the people is the voice of God) (Enoch, 2018). For the Khawarij, anyone who is Muslim, just, and capable of being a caliph is eligible. In addition to the requirements for the quality of the caliphate which includes piety, proximity to the people, and bai'ah. From this description, Khawarij is closer to the Sunni understanding that Al-Maududi said to be the understanding of Theo-Democracy; that is, a divine democratic system of government with limited people's sovereignty (Alizadeh Mousavi, 2023). Maududi emphasized that the basic principle of Islam is that

human beings, both individually and in groups, must surrender all means of power, legislation, and control over everything. No one is allowed to give orders or rules of his own accord and is not allowed to admit the obligation to carry out such orders. No one is given the privilege of making laws as he pleases and is not obliged to bind himself to laws formed in this way, all of which are the right of Allah. And according to this tree, sovereignty is in the hands of God, He is the Lawgiver, and even the Messenger is the subject of this commandment of God. (Gearing & McMahan, 2016).

The Socio-Religio-Political Impact of the Shiffin War

From the entire discussion above, it is clear to us that the development of Islamic political thought has never departed from a paradigm that originates from the search for religious relations with the state. However, the movement of the Islamic pendulum from time to time always shifts, sometimes in the direction of *das-sein* (read: socio-historical or *ta'lîliy* and/or *ishtislâhiy*) and at other times in the direction of *das-sollen* (textual-normative or *bayâniy*). The Shiffin War had caused a permanent split in the Muslim community at the time, and Muslims were divided over the Caliphate. The end of the Shiffin War also made the Muslim dispute grow and split into several sects of Islam. Because of this division, then at that time religious interests such as Sunni, Shia, and also Khawarij developed Islam to be different from each other and form distinctive religious institutions in their respective communities.

Historians view that the results of *Tahkîm* are not the best solution for the interests of Muslims. Because, the results of the *tahkim* only satisfied one party (the Mu'awiyah side and its supporters), and harmed the other (Ali and his supporters), and even proved to have caused division among Muslims.

Tahkîm, which was originally intended as an effort for peace, did not meet the qualifications as a decision expected by Muslims who were at war. It has caused new divisions. Because the result is seen as something that benefits one party and harms the other.

Apart from the results that have been formulated, Muslims are divided into 3 major groups: (1) The supporters of Mu'awiyah, which later became known as Sunni; (2) The loyal supporters of Ali bin Abi Talib, who became known as Shia; and (3) the opposition group of Mu'awiyah and Ali, which became known as Khawarij.

This division not only creates internal conflicts that rely on political interests. However, it also rests on the interests of *Aqidah*, with the development of several theological schools, whose embryos have existed since the time of the caliphate of Uthman bin Affan, such as *Qadariyyah* and *Jabbariyyah*, which later developed into *firqahs* that influenced the development of Islamic political thought. Thus, in addition to the positive (expected) changes, the division between Muslims (which was unexpected), as a result of the Shiffin war which ended with *Tahkîm*, was increasingly difficult to avoid.

As an *'ibrah*, Muslims, especially their leaders, should be wise to make the Shiffin event a mirror to hack the interests of *Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah*. Even if we look back, the political disputes during the caliphate of Uthman bin 'Affan, the Jamal War, and the

continuation of conflicts between Muslims during the Nahrawan War, all occurred because of the immature attitude of Muslims in responding to reality, especially in politics, for the future interests of Muslims.

Its Religio-Political Implications

Although it is not explicitly mentioned, the growth and development of fiqh and political factions among Muslims after the Shiffin War became a reality.

There are 2 (two) fiqh and political factions that grew and developed after the Shiffin war, namely: Shi'ah and Khawarij whose growth and development are assumed to have a large share in the growth and development of fiqh and political factions among Muslims to this day. The gathering of ideas and feuds between Muslims through Shi'ah and Khawarij has developed fiqh and other political factions which are considered to be a reaction to the presence of the 2 (two) groups, namely: fiqh and the Murji'ah faction. (Nursahid, 2022).

Conclusion

The Shiffin War provides a very valuable lesson, especially for the faith of Islam. This is because it turns out that political feuds between Muslims have proven to have made the greatest contribution to the collapse of brotherhood between Muslims. Starting from the dispute that occurred between Al-Fitnah al-Kubra during the reign of Uthman bin Affan which ended in the killing of Uthman bin Affan, followed by a civil war between Muslims which culminated in the outbreak of the Shiffin War is a historical event that ultimately gave birth to various firqahs, with their respective political visions. As an implication of the war, Shi'a and Khawarij groups emerged. The two groups emerged due to the same factors, namely extremities and contradictions. The emergence of Khawarij played a great role in the emergence and spread of Shia. The fight between the two firqah gave rise to another firqah that aimed to mediate between two contradictory camps, namely: Murji'ah, a firqah who dared to come up with his vision, although in the end, it became a synthesis between two other firqahs, by giving birth to a Sunni group.

These groups not only gave birth to theological understanding but at the same time gave birth to various state political ideas in Islam, which in the end also gave rise to divisions among Muslims who until now have been separated into three major groups: Shi'ah, Sunni, and Khawarij. Based on this reality, Muslims should learn from the past (history of internal feuds), to then find solutions to the problems of the ummah that rely on division, towards unity and unity, to realize themselves as chair ummah, summation wâhidah, summation was then, and syuhadâ' alannâs, as the vision of the Qur'an that was once presented by the Prophet (saw) with his companions and his successors who have the spirit of faith and struggle The same towards noble ideals, became the first and foremost in knitting ukhuwah which was once scattered with the adagio 'Fastabiqû al-Khairât'.

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